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1. Crisis of the elected democratic representation in Bohemia and Moravia   
In the last decade, there has been a parliamentary crisis of the elected democratic representation. 
This is caused partly by the election system, which usually produces governments based mostly 
on a wide unstable coalition. A government´s average lifespan is less than two years.1  
Petr Fiala sees the only solution in the change of the election system aiming at creating a stable 
political government: “If we do not do it … we should not wonder and be offended by the 
political performance (of both the government and the parliament), since it is simply not 
possible to do it much better in the existing system.”2 In 2013, President Václav Klaus said: 
“Not the power abuse, but weak governance has become the main problem of the Czech politics 
in the last more than fifteen years … The sticking point is also the election system contributing 
to the existence of weak governments … The system of proportional representation creates 
fragile and politically heterogenous coalitions that are exposed to permanent crises.”3 
Another fact is a permanent growth in medializing everything that relates to politics. Politicians 
have come under such scrutiny of media that only the very strong individuals realize their 
political visions. Others are trying to hide behind somebody else not to be seen. This pressure 
is purposefully aimed at the elected politicians. If a politician gets drunks, it is in the news 
immediately. If a judge does the same, it usually remains without notice or the affair quickly 
fades away. Judges are not the subject of such media pressure as politicians. Let me give you 
an example. Number of people in the academic sphere in Bohemia and Moravia acquired 
associate professorship or professorship in Slovakia. If a judge from highest courts or the 
Constitutional Court obtained this title that way, it is not the subject of public debate. If this 
title is acquired by an academician who is also a politician, immediately there are speculations 
as to whether it is a proper title. Of course, it is. It is usually the consequence of not-so-good 
relations in the domestic workplace. 
The aforementioned leads to the loss of authority of the elected representation in the public 
sphere, that is to say of the parliament and the government, and to the transfer of authority to 
courts, namely administrative courts and the Constitutional Court. This trend is supported by 
the weak political representation itself and by taking the disputes over political direction – 
which should have been and should be decided primarily by the ballot boxes – to courtrooms, 
because the opposition regularly takes its loss in the Parliament to the Constitutional Court. An 
activist Constitutional Court does not hesitate to grasp the offered opportunity and enters, under 
cover of constitutionality protection, the political arena of the opposition against the coalition. 
                                                          
1 Since 1992, when the four-year parliamentary term and the subsequent governmental term was established, there 
have been 15 governments – the first government of Václav Klaus between 1992-96, the second government of 
Václav Klaus between 1996-98, the government of Josef Tošovský in 1998, of Miloš Zeman between 1998-2002, 
of Vladimír Špidla between 2002-04, of Stanislav Gross between 2004-05, of Jiří Paroubek between 2005-06, the 
first government of Mirek Topolánek between 2006-07, the second government of Mirek Topoloánek between 
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term anticipated by the Constitution – the first government of Václav Klaus and the government of Miloš Zeman. 
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Lenin´s words about the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks can be used here: “Power was lying 
on the street, so we picked it up. It is now picked up by the constitutional courts. The 
Constitutional Court is, however, only one of the state authorities with an indirect bond to the 
people as the source of power in a democratic state. Democracy may be weakened, but the 
government of elected is still its essence. And I see nothing better than democracy, at least for 
now.”  
The judiciary in a democratic state should not become a political tool in the sense of 
implementing the objectives of power of its representatives. If that happens, it is owing to the 
judicial activism, so to say owing to the judges themselves.  
These are constitutionally conforming tools of strengthening the power of judges. There will 
always be power in the state. If the power of the parliament and the government, either formally 
or informally, weakens, it is transferred somewhere else – to the judges and central bank 
councils, which are the bodies not primarily established by elections.  
Such a sceptical attitude towards judges can be found even in the New Testament in the Gospel 
according to Luke in Jesus´s words: “In a certain town, there was a judge who neither feared 
God nor cared about men. And there was a widow in that town who kept coming to him with 
the plea: “Grant me just against my adversary.” For some time, he refused. But finally, he said 
to himself: “Even though I do not fear God or care about men, yet because this widow keeps 
bothering me, I will see that she gets justice, so that she will not eventually wear me out with 
her coming!”4 It is a picture of a judge who acts well only to set himself free from a party in 
the dispute.  
2. Material core of the Constitution and cancellation of constitutional laws as an 
uncontrollable source of judicial power 
However, a new element joined the game – theory of the material core of the Constitution and 
attempts of some judicial courts at seizing the cancellation of constitutional laws without the 
explicit constitutional authorization. Even with the great factual power, the judges in continental 
law were considered interpreters, not establishers, of the law. The truth is that an interpretation 
may be very extensive but the judges were not those who grasped the roles of constitutional 
establishers. Material core of the law alone is nothing new. In the past, the states expressly 
recognised the priority of the right of God, which is still binding for the believers nowadays. 
The contents of the right of God has been obvious for millennia and its interpretation cannot be 
arbitrary today. It is possible not to obey it, but then it is obvious that it is not obeyed. Even the 
pope as the Christ´s deputy on Earth, although there were popes with great powers, is only an 
interpreter, never the creator of the right of God. That is his limit, restriction of his power. If a 
pope does something bad, his position as the pope does not change the nature of the deed. Even 
Alexander VI, the famous Rodrigo Borgia, could commit sins against the right of God, but he 
did not have the power to pronounce his sins the right – he was not the creator of the right of 
God as the material core or the transcendental source of the human right.  
However, the theory of the material core independent of the right of God is newly applied, 
whereas it is factually created with reference to unchangeable and perpetual provisions of the 
constitution by the judges. Especially the judges of the constitutional courts through 
appropriation of the power to cancel a constitutional act.5 This way, they react to the fact that 
the human right may be changed anytime by the people and they search for its new 
transcendental basis. In the words of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde: “A free, secularized state 
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lives from the presumptions that it is not able to guarantee.”6 In the words of Petr Hájek: “ … 
a person who lost God is left to the mercy of – a person.”7 
The creator of a rule is the master of the rule and the rule depends on them. A rule created by 
the people may always be changed by the people, although it pronounces itself to be eternal. A 
transcendental rule may only come from a transcendental legislator. If the transcendental source 
(creator) of a right is God, the judge is subject to it. If it is another material core (focus) of the 
constitution, it is created by the judge and the judge is superior to it, he plays the God himself. 
An attempt at a transcendental and thus unchangeable rule without God is an attempt at the third 
path in law. From the viewpoint of Christianity and Judaism, it is an idol, since there is no God 
other than the God, there is no other transcendental legislator.8 
Power is tasty and its tastiness was described by Ladislav Mňačko, a famous Slovakian and 
Moravian writer born in Valašské Klobouky in Moravia. The judges enjoy it, too. Thus they 
have higher responsibility to prevent themselves from unlimited disposal of this power, prevent 
themselves in the gradual process of connecting the power to interpret the law with the power 
to create constitutional rules by making themselves superior to the democratic constitution-
maker.  
3. Democratic point of view 
There is no other legitimacy in secularized democracy than the consensus of the majority. 
Although the government of the majority has its problem points as any other government, it is 
the essence of democracy that cannot be removed without the state losing its democratic regime. 
In democracy, a citizen is the subject and object of the power. He/she is subject to the power 
but can wilfully co-create it, since he/she elects those who co-decide. During deciding by 
constitutional courts, central banks and similar institutions, a citizen is the object of the power, 
its vassal. He/she cannot participate in the decision-making.  
Most of the democratic states introduced the rigidity of the fundamental legal rules called 
constitutional. Thus, in order to create or amend them, it is not enough to have simple majority 
– qualified majority is required. This secures a wider consensus of the society over 
constitutional rules in comparison with the lower consensus necessary for the adoption of 
ordinary acts. This wider consensus is accompanied by higher stability of constitutional rules. 
Nevertheless, the determination of constitutional rules remains in the hands of the parliament 
as a representative group elected by the people or is decided directly by the people in a 
referendum or there are various combinations possible. Everything remains within democracy 
which, in its essence, does not and cannot have a different basis of the sovereign power than 
the people.   
Democracy is based on trust in people, which is fully expressed in the words of Tomáš Garrigue 
Masaryk: “… democracy is an opinion of life, it lies in trust in people, humanity and 
humanness, and there is no trust without love and no love without trust.”9 The quality of a 
democratic government is dependent on the quality of the majority, which gave the power to 
                                                          
6 ERNST-WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE: Recht, Staat, Freiheit. Studienzur Rechtsphilosophie, 
Staatstheorieund Verfassungsgeschichte. 2nd edition Frankfurt am Main, 2006, ISBN 3-518-28514-9, s. 112. 
PAVEL HOLLÄNDER: Ústavní změny: Mezi neurózou a surrealismem. Ústavné právo 20 rokov po páde 
komunizmu. Plzeň 2011, ISBN 978-80-7380-302-5, pages 8-9. 
7 PETR P. HÁJEK: Smrt v sametu. Praha 2012, ISBN 978-80-87423-38-7, p. 85. 
8 ZDENĚK KOUDELKA. Transcedentální pramen práva. Trestní právo 11-12/2013, s. 10–21. ISSN 1211-2860. 
9 KAREL ČAPEK: Hovory s T. G. Masarykem. Praha 1990, ISBN 80-202-0170, část 3. Myšlení a život, kapitola 




govern to the power holders.10 This quality either exists or does not exist, but the consent of the 
majority as the source of government in democracy cannot be replaced. Other sources of 
government are possible but not in democracy. 
If we accept the existence of a legally undefined material core of the constitution and thus the 
possibility of cancelling constitutional acts by the Constitutional Court for other reasons than a 
defective procedure of their adoption, then in reality, the superior state body becomes the 
Constitutional Court which takes off people´s sovereignty and seizes it by itself. Constitutional 
judge Jan Musil said: “… adopted solution (cancellation of the constitutional act – author´s 
note), in my opinion, violates the subtle balance between the principles of democratic nature 
and lawfulness to the harm of the principle of democratic nature.” Then he continues: “This 
trend is the expression of the elitist concept of the “law interpretation key holders”, which has 
regularly repeated itself in human history. In my opinion, it is a destructive concept not leading 
to good endings.” He also recalls Churchill´s comment describing democracy as the best of all 
bad governing models. The constitutional court gains the rule in the state, its sovereignty.11 
The extent of performing the power based on the material core of the constitution depends only 
on the self-limitation of the Constitutional Court. That is in the situation when it is secured by 
the material core of the constitution, however, without its express defining by the constitution-
maker, which leads to uncertainty as to the understanding of this concept by the Constitutional 
Court. The rule factually applies to each uncontrollable power holder. It can cancel whatever 
and explain it with the interpretation of the material core of constitutionality. Although, at first, 
each power holder argues with the necessity of a correct result before the correct process, it is 
only a question of time, when the result is arbitrariness. Radoslav Procházka talks about a 
“gospel over freedom, the protection of which stops being, in the regime of a preferred correct 
result before the correct process, perceived as the first and the fundamental reason of existence 
of a state”.12 American judge Learned Hand talks about the desire of some judges to be superior 
to the parliament: “I would have hopeless feeling, if I was to be ruled by a group of Platonic 
guards, even if I knew how to select them well, which I definitely do not know. If they were 
making decisions, I would lack the impulse contained in the possibility to live in the society, in 
which I at least have a theoretical participation in the administration of public affairs.”13 
Pavel Hasenkopf sees the doctrine of the material core of the constitution as deeply 
undemocratic: “The doctrine of the material core of the constitution itself is very problematic 
… This vague basis can be used to reason basically everything regarded by the Constitutional 
court as incorrect, and any time it is given opportunity to do so. This doctrine is deeply 
undemocratic, in its very essence… In other words, the judicial power exceeds the borders of 
its own powers to the harm of the constitution-holder. … And it is up to the responsibility of 
other state bodies not to make this approach, completely denying legal safeguards, a common 
method of legal interpretation.”14 
                                                          
10 RADOSLAV PROCHÁZKA: Ľud a sudcovia v konštitučnej demokracii. Plzeň 2011, ISBN 978-80-7380-328-
5, p. 55. 
11 JAN MUSIL: points 13, 17, 20 of part III. Změna paradigmatu demokratického a právního státu of his dissent 
standpoint to resolution of the Constitutional Court dated September 15, 2009, no. Pl.ÚS 24/09 in the matter of 
constitutional complaint against reduction of the term of Chamber of Deputies by a constitutional act. 
12 RADOSLAV PROCHÁZKA: Ľud a sudcovia v konštitučnej demokracii. Plzeň 2011, ISBN 978-80-7380-328-
5, p. 7. 
13 LEARNED HAND: The Contributionsofan Independent Judiciary to Civilization. The Spirit ofLiberty. New 
York 1952, s. 73-74. RADOSLAV PROCHÁZKA: Ľud a sudcovia v konštitučnej demokracii. Plzeň 2011, ISBN 
978-80-7380-328-5, p. 98-99, 105. 
14 PAVEL HASENKOPF: Jak to bylo s ratifikací Římského statutu Mezinárodního trestního soudu. Právní 




The popularity of the theory of material core of the constitution may also be supported by the 
disappointment from the practice of parliamentary democracy and party politics, as well as the 
efforts at attaching to some other non-elected human authority – Constitutional Court. However, 
there is only the people and God above constitution-maker in democracy. If somebody refuses 
God, only the people remain. If we replace the people with the Constitutional Court, we are 
replacing democracy with another regime. Trust in courts may lead to disillusion just as in the 
case of party politics. People-judges are as good or bad as people-deputies.   
The USA example clearly shows how the Supreme Court restricted the rights of the people and 
supported slavery in the 19th century. This issue was decided by the people to the disadvantage 
of the court in the civil war of the North against the South subsequently. But even then, the 
Supreme Court promoted the preservation of racial segregation. In 1857, the U.S. Supreme 
Court used the case of Dred Scott, a slave, to determine that slaves are not part of the people 
and citizens who have the right to freedom and cannot claim any rights whatsoever, including 
court protection. In addition, it proclaimed the laws of the Congress which forbade slavery in 
some states unconstitutional, which was the second case of applying the court´s possibility to 
proclaim the act unconstitutional and annul it after the first case in 1803 (Marbury v. 
Madison).15 After the war of the North against the South, constitutional amendments were 
adopted – the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 forbidding slavery and serfdom, the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868 of equality of citizens and a regular court process, and the Fifteenth 
Amendment in 1870 forbidding election discrimination based on the race. In 1875, the Congress 
adopted an act on civil rights containing a ban on discrimination. A part of this act was 
proclaimed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, when the court admitted that a black man 
might be refused a job in public accommodation. In its following decisions, it also admitted 
racial segregation in the education system, transport and other services. Its concept of equality 
was based on the statement that if there is segregation on railway, both the blacks and the whites 
must have the same services available, albeit separated first classes and sleeping cars.16 The 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court made in the 19th century show that judges may fight with 
the democratic parliament based on the principles that we today see as unacceptable. Some anti-
segregation decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court from the second half of the 20th century are 
only remedies of the preceding undemocratic acts of this institution. And it was the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which sanctified the mass internment of American citizens of Japanese origin 
during World War II for the reasons of their origin.17 
The desire of those who are not able or willing to enforce their ideas by a regular change in the 
law and by defending their issues in elections, but only use their power regardless of the law, 
is aptly characterized by the statement of the Nazi legal theoretician Carl Schmitt: “We are 
changing the comprehension of legal concepts … We are on the side of future things.”18 In 
other words, if I lack democratic majority to properly change a legal rule in the parliament, I 
give it new contents through the court. But what are those future things? And do we all want 
them or is it just a certain group of us? 
An example is the introduction of same-sex marriages. Sometimes the advocates of their 
legalization take the road of a political fight through parliaments and referendums. This road 
                                                          
15 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). HELENA PETRŮV: Kruh americké koncepce rovnosti 
(Od diskriminace menšin k diskriminaci většiny). Právník 10/2008, ISSN 0231-6625, p. 1085-1086. RADOSLAV 
PROCHÁZKA: Ľud a sudcovia v konštitučnej demokracii. Plzeň 2011, ISBN 978-80-7380-328-5, p. 5-6. 
16The Civil Richts Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Mc.Cabe v. Atchison, 
Topeka&Santa FeRailway, 235 U.S. 151 (1914). HELENA PETRŮV: Kruh americké koncepce rovnosti (Od 
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17 Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 




led to success in catholic Ireland on the 22nd May 2015, when the referendum accepted the 
possibility of a marriage of two people regardless of their sex, or in Finland, where this 
requirement was legalized in February 2015. In some other countries, these efforts are taken by 
a court fight. When the defenders of this understanding of marriage lose their fight through 
political tools, they try to recover the change as their constitutional right.19 The courts then 
change the comprehension of legal concepts. In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court pronounced the 
prohibition of homosexual marriages practiced in some states of the American union 
unconstitutional.20 Thus its close majority of 5 to 4 accepted the new concept of marriage as a 
union of two women or two men. I am positive that the originators of the American constitution 
in the 18th century would be surprised about what they are being told by the Supreme Court in 
the 21st century. In those times, other marriage than bond of a man and a woman was 
unthinkable. And are 5 people superior to the thousands of members of the U.S. Congresses 
and the member states, who have a constitutional right to a constitutional change? And do the 
judges stop there? Certainly not. It is only a question of time when somebody wants to recover 
polygamy. After all, the USA have experience with the polygamy of the Mormons. The 
fundamental life questions should be decided by a sovereign. Even some judges realize so. The 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts as the member of a disagreeing minority of judges stated to the 
advocates of the change: “They are not celebrating the Constitution. It does not have to do with 
it. (…)This court is not legislature. Whether a homosexual marriage is a good idea should not 
be our interest.”21 Judge Antonin Scalia wrote: “Today´s decision means that my ruler and the 
ruler of 320 million Americans from one coastline to another is the majority of nine lawyers of 
the Supreme Court. This standpoint expands the court powers in such a manner, of which the 
Constitution or the amendments did not even think. The practice of such constitutional revision 
of the unelected committee of nine, always supported by a great appraisal of freedom, robs 
people of the most important freedom enforced in the Declaration of Independence and won in 
the revolution of 1776 – the freedom to be their own rulers.”22 
The sovereign in democracy is the people who can decide either directly or through their 
temporarily elected representatives. If the decisions are made by judges not elected by the 
people, who hold their offices for a lifetime or for a very long time, democratic quality given 
as the governing of the elected and the governing for time are reduced. Such change in the 
fundamental characteristics of the state is possible, however, it must be made by amending the 
constitution, not by violating pro-judicial interpretation of the judges as such.  
4. Conclusion  
Judges are people, their legal education does not make them any better, and even they are 
attracted by the power and try to adapt the rules to their advantages. That is corroborated by the 
President of the Constitutional Court in Brno, Pavel Rychetský, who let himself be reappointed 
not only the judge of the Constitutional Court in 2013, but also its President. This way, his act 
denied the reasoning of the finding of the Constitutional Court23 preventing other court 
Presidents from repeating their functions. Rychetský´s words seem hypocritical after having 
                                                          
19 BOLESLAW BANASZKIEWICZ: The New Wave of Interest in Marriage in 
Constitutional Law: Reflections on the Central European Experience. Sapientisat Warszawa 2016, ISBN 
9788394438203. 
20 Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court from the 26th June 2015. James Obergefell, et al., Petitioners v. Richard 
Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al. 
21 Introduction of the dissent standpoint of the Chief Justice John G. Roberts, p. 2. 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf  
22 Introduction of the dissent standpoints of the judges Antonio Scalia and Clarence Thomas, p. 2. 
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23 Část IV. výroku a část V.e, bod 65 of the reasoning of the finding no 294/2010 Coll. (Pl.ÚS 39/08). ZDENĚK 




himself reappointed the President of the Court: “I have been a long-term permanent opponent 
of the possibility to repeat the mandate of a judge of the Constitutional Court. I reckon it should 
last longer but should not be repeated.”24 
The assessment of judges and lawyers may suitably be used in the words of Jan Musil, a judge 
of the Constitutional Court in Brno: “The idea that lawyers may be those, who in the final 
instance manage to solve the dispute between the right and the wrong, is absolutely incorrect 
and rebut in history countless times…. Or did the lawyers prevent totality regimes from existing 
and working? Did not the judges assist in the crimes of fascistic and communistic justice?”25  
4.1  How lawyers, not the law, may fail  
“Judicial state” existed in Bohemia and Moravia in times of World War II, when the emeritus 
President of the Highest Administration Court, Emil Hácha, was the state President of the 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and Jaroslav Krejčí, who from 1938 and during the 
Protectorate had held the function of the President of the Constitutional Court, was the long-
term Prime Minister between 1942-45. Great lawyers, poor politicians, who remained in their 
functions even after the Lidice massacre. Regretfully, judges often fight for democracy and 
human rights in the time when the state is democratic, not in the time when it is needed to go 
to the barricades. How odd are in this relation the words of the President of the Constitutional 
Court, Jaroslav Krejčí, from the times when he was its secretary, when in reaction to the 
prevention from a scientific research in Germany and to defend the legality of the Night of the 
Long Knives by Carl Schmitt26, he stated: “It is natural that under such circumstances, when 
objective scientific work may not only be inconvenient, but also dangerous, decent lawyers 
become silent.27 Neither he, nor others stayed silent as lawyers even after occupation in 1939 
and collaborated with the Germans. 
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